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Abstract—The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is
rising constantly whether for leisure or professional purposes
in civilian or Defense domains. We consider in this study small
civilian aerial drones of different types, which are low cost,
available off the shelf and so affordable for individuals. Simulta-
neously, they have also raised security concerns for critical sites
such as nuclear stations, strategic locations like official buildings,
crowded places as stadiums, etc. The aim of this paper is to
provide a survey of the risks assessment with and for UAVs
in general. Regarding the security concern we pay a specific
attention to attacks that are facilitated and can benefit from an
easy access to Software Defined Radio (SDR) boards that can be
embedded in the UAV or in the ground segment.
Index Terms—Civilian drones, Software Defined Radio, Secu-
rity, Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical threat concerning UAVs is the attack from the
drone to a ground target, the counter attack implies a detec-
tion up to a neutralization operation from the ground. This
schematic view can both be extended to the cases where the
attack is from the ground to the drone of from a drone to
another drone. We observe that low cost SDR environments
and boards can strongly facilitate the implementations of such
existing and possible attacks, on the other hand, it also pro-
vides opportunities for counter attacks. This survey is mainly
devoted to the approaches with acquisition and processing
operations by means of low cost SDR COTS (Commercial Off
The Shelf) board implementation. So we looked for civilian
drone platforms only, of fixed wings or multirotor types, with
COTS (modified or not) or DIY (Do It Yourself) UAVs.
Different types of communications for the ground control,
video transmission and telemetry link can be used like Wi-Fi,
LTE (Long Term Evolution), Industrial Scientific and Medical
bands (ISM, e.g. 433 or 866 MHz). Such constraints do not
prevent to have efficient actions presenting a severe risk.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we first
present a classification of the risks for this context. Beyond
the synthesis of existing demonstrated attacks and countermea-
sures, the objective is to investigate opportunities which are
unexplored or underused so far but that could turn into major
risks in the near future. Then, our ambition is not to identify
inherent vulnerabilities and countermeasures, which is a future
work, but to show how SDR platforms can be used to address
them. In section III we briefly present the SDR platforms under
consideration with the definitions and the limiting constraints.
Sections IV focus to the known literature attacks from drone
to ground and from ground to drone respectively. Finally in
section V, we summarize current limitations and new concepts
not considered so far. We finally conclude by focusing on an
analysis of risk for the next future.
II. CLASSIFICATION AND RELATED STATE OF THE ART
In [1] an attack taxonomy to UAV has been proposed, this
taxonomy had been firstly introduced by [2] for autonomous
vehicle security and adapted by Krishna et al. to UAVs. In
this model, two branches separate attack vectors and targets.
Attack vector is the way used by an attacker to access to a
server or a computer in order to send or execute malicious
code on a target device. Two sub-branches are used to define
invasive and non-invasve attacks. The first one requires access
to the hardware while the other uses side channel such as
sound, infra-red or electromagnetic fields. The other branch
lists all the targets of potential attack vectors such as sensors,
communication links or control units. Another taxonomy pro-
posed in [3] classifies attacks using security parameters CIA
(Confidentiaity, Integrity, Availability) this concept is extended
to Privacy and Trust when most of the previous attacks can
be mapped.
In this study, we chose to present drone attacks with a
different point of view, it results in a classification summarised
in Table I. The main objective is to identify where the SDR
board is or can be used to implement an attack and/or a
countermeasure, and so to highlight current and future risks.
So the analysis focuses on two facets: the first corresponds to
the targets of the attack and the second one corresponds to the
direction of the attack. The targets of the attack and so possible
countermeasures are multiple, it can be the remote telecontrol,
the telemetry, the sensor (mainly GPS), the physical signature
(audio, optical, infra-red, radar, electromagnetic, ...), the em-
bedded software or cognitive channel (cognitive scrambling,
stealthy communication, ...). The direction of attacks can be
from ground to drone or drone to ground, it could also be from
drone to drone. We found none or very few attacks on the
remote control or data acquisition links from drone to drone
or drone to ground direction. Nevertheless, SDR platform is
interesting in this context, because it can change or download
its configurations to match its strategies to its targets. This is
clearly an upcoming risk that must be consider, since it is easy
to imagine an attack based on a malicious use of a wireless
network that would be implemented with a SDR platform. For
instance, the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity)
catcher can be embedded by a UAV, or cognitive embedded
SDR radio can reuse spectrum inactivity (or work as a smart
jammer) in unauthorised bands. Few works published in the
scientific literature exist on data theft (line 2), but press articles
relate such facts like the well known case of insurgents in Iraq
that hacked live video feeds from unmanned American MQ-1
Predator which was not encrypted. This type of events brings
to the light, the possibility of such attacks that require an
urgent answer. For sensors hacking (line 3), the same attacks
and countermesures can be imagined for drone to drone and
drone to ground direction. Compared to what is observed with
ground to drone direction, one can also speculate that better
results may be obtained thanks to the mobility of UAV. To the
best of our knowledge, radio footprint tampering (line 4) has
not yet been (at least published) developed and embedded on a
drone. However there is no doubt that this is a rising upcoming
risk. Firmware or forentics attacks (line5) are currently rare,
however for some drones such as Dji, firmware updates uses
Wi-Fi, so such an attack is possible and so may soon be
revealed. We will extend this discussion in Section III.
III. SDR PLATFORMS
SDR nodes provide flexibility, upgradability for civilian
and military radio equipment. They can be used with success
to implement multistandard terminals or when context-aware
radio equipment is needed. In their new survey on SDR, the
authors of [46] discuss on architecture, design methodologies,
development tools and perspectives. They propose a compar-
ison of SDR platforms according to the following criteria :
programmability, flexibility, portability, power consumption,
energy efficiency and cost. This synthesis is interesting for
software developers to choose an SDR platform and tools that
best-fit their needs but important features are missing for radio
and system architects. For instance, it is difficult to choose
the best SDR platform that can be embedded by a drone for
one given application (e.g. detection, eavesdropper, spoofer,
telecontrol, telemetry). There is little information available
related to frequency tuning capability, oscillator precision,
radio-frequency bandwidth, transmission power, number of
receiver and transceiver channels and weight. In the context
of a small UAV, capacity and form factor such as weight and
size are critical to allow the system to be embedded. Moreover
the precision parameters are important for problems such as
localisation, stealth and spoofing.
The purpose of Table II is to provide a current overview of
SDR platforms solutions that do not exceed a cost of 15,000
euros. This is an arbitrary choice but we think it can reflect
a kind of maximum price (or psychological threshold) SDR
amateurs may consider for the purchase a ground station or
an embedded platform. Of course, this list is not exhaustive
but we have tried to show the most popular actors of the
market place as well as popular platforms in the field of
radio ham and academic research. In this table, the first three
columns concern communication protocols used by attackers
or defenders. The next three columns represent the degree of
performance for the acquisition front end. The seventh column
gives the scaling of computing power of the SDR platform.
The last four columns are interesting to evaluate the SDR
platform embeddedability on UAVs.
SDR platform benefits differ according to the role (attacker
or target) played by the platform and its mobility needs
in the context of UAV attacks. Next, we will identify use
cases that justify the use of SDR platform according to these
requirements.
A. Interest of SDR on the attacker side
To the attacker side, target can be mobile or static.
1) From the ground to UAVs (fixed SDR): when the attacker
and the target are static, the SDR platform offers some
flexibility thanks to the access to baseband signals. Time
and frequency attacks can then be directly implemented in
software. However, when the SDR platform uses an operating
system, latency should be taken into account. For example,
some protocols used by RFID (Radio Frequency Identification)
technology, which is strongly constrained in time, can’t be
directly supported by a software implementation using SDR
platforms [47]. For this type of attack, columns 1 to 6 related
to radio front end and converters are the most important criteria
of Table II.
2) From the UAV to Ground or UAVs (mobile SDR): when
the attacker has a mobile SDR platform, the attacker is in the
same channel state as the target, so it can track the target and
adapt its algorithms to the slight fluctuations of channel to
escape many detection algorithms based on Doppler, delay
or power analysis [48]. In this use case, columns 8 to 10
related to form factor and power consumption are the most
important criteria of Table II because SDR platform is used
as the payload of a UAV.
B. Interest of SDR on the target side
1) Ground against UAV (fixed SDR): direct access to radio
signal gives to the defender, the ability to extract relevant
signal information like Doppler, Delay, or Phase Coherence.
It has then many possibilities to adapt the UAV search algo-
rithms to the observed channel characteristics. In this kind of
counter-measures, important columns of Table II are also the
same as for fixed SDR attackers platforms. When a defender
seeks to locate a single UAV or a swarm, high resolution
antenna processing algorithm techniques such as MUSIC,
Root-MUSIC or ESPRIT can be implemented by the SDR
platform. The expansion capabilities of several synchronized
antennas, namely external oscillators (see column 5 of Table
II) are important to consider.
2) UAV against Ground or UAVs (mobile SDR): in transmit-
ters geolocalization, the mobility of defenders allows receivers
to change the positions of fixed points used by a multilateration
algorithms. Tracking of a Periodic RF transmitter with a
mobile receiver is an old topic well discussed by the scien-
tific community. Many algorithms, based on optimal sensor
placement, have been developed to estimate Time Difference
of Arrival Localization (TDOA). Then, mobile SDR platform
has the ability to locate transmitters with better accuracy. The
TDOA time resolution, and consequently the spatial resolution
of a sensor network, depends on the accuracy of sample rate
and bandwidth. For these reasons, columns 2, 5 and 8 to 10
of Table II related to accuracy of oscillator, board form factor
and power consumption are critical. For such an embedded
TABLE I
SDR-BASED ATTACKS
Attack from Ground station to Drone Attack from Drone to Drone Attack from Drone to Ground
Attack Detection Attack Detection Attack Detection
& Countermeasures & Countermeasures & Countermeasures
Remote [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [5] [9] [10] — — — [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]
Control
Remote [5] — — — [16] —
Data
Acquisition
Sensors [17] [18] [19] [20] [22] [23] [24] — [25] — [25] [24]
[21] [26] [27] [28]
Physical — [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] — — — —
Signature [36] [37] [38] [39] [40]
Firmware / [41], [42], [43] [44] [45] — — —
Forensics
TABLE II
SDR PLATFORMS COMPARISON
Freq. Bands
(MHz-GHz)
Bandwidth
(MHz)
Tx
power
(dbm)
Resolution
(ADC/DAC)
Oscillator
precision
(ppm)
Rx ×
Tx
Computing
Unit
Power
(W)
FF
Size(mm)
FF Weight
(g)
Battery
USRP E312 70-6 56 > 10 12/12 ±2 2x2 Zynq 7020 2-6 133 x 68.2 x
31.8
446 yes
USRP X320 DC-6 120 > 10 14/16 ±2 2x2 Kintex 7-410T 45 217 x 218 x
39
1700 no
Matchstiq S11 70-6 50 < 13 12/12 ±1 1x1 Freescale
iMX.6
Spartan6
LX45T
? 112 x 42 x
29
142 no
Quadratiq 70 - 6 50 5 12/12 ±1 4x1 Zynq 7030 18 214 x 147 x
41
708 no
PicoZed 70-6 0.2-56 9 12/12 ? 2x2 Zynq 7035 ? Dev Zynq ? no
PlutoSDR 325-3.8 20 7 12/12 ? 1x1 Zynq 7010 117x79x24 114 no
PicoSDR 56-6 56 10-18 12/12 ? 4x4/8x8 Virtex6 /
Quad-Core i7
35-86 48x215x290
/
45x365x378
2400/5600 no
HackRF 1-6 20 15 8/8 ±20 1x1 ? 125x80x26 201 no
BladeRF 300-3.8 28 6 12/12 ±1 1x1 Cyclone IV 4 87x131x18 80 no
LimeSDR 100-3.8 61.44 10 12/12 ±4 2x2 Cyclone IV 4 110x60 20 no
XTRX 100-3.8 61.44 10 12/12 < ±1 2x2 Artix 7 35T ? 30x51 20 no
AirSpy 24-1.7 6 12 ±0.5 1x0 ? 77x26x10 21 no
RTL-SDR V3 0.5-1.7 2.7 8 ±1 1x0 < 2 ? ? no
SDRplay 0.1-2 10 12 ±0.5 1x0 < 1 95x80x30 110 no
FunCube 0.15-0.24/
420-1.9
? ? ? 1x0 < 1 ? 260 no
Warp v3 2.4G / 5.4 40 20 12/12 ? 2x2 Virtex-6
LX240T
? ? ? no
Kudar 5.25G-5.85 30 21 14/16 ? 1x1 Virtex-2 P30 ? ? ? no
system, the computing unit (Col. 7) is also very critical since
it must not introduce any prejudicial latency.
IV. STATE OF THE ART OF SMALL-UAV RELATED ATTACKS
We identify here the different cases encountered in the
current literature with the use of a small UAV platform
associated with a COTS SDR solution and we map out these
cases in Table I. Three types of applications can be considered,
depending on which side we position the SDR hardware and
where is the target of the attack: from a ground station to
a drone platform, conversely from a drone to the ground, or
even from a drone to another drone. In each case, we can
regard the SDR to operate the attack or the defense. These
different families of applications are represented by columns
of Table I. We then detail in rows what is the concrete element
of the drone implied in the attack. This element can be the
control system, the data telemetry wireless link, the sensors of
the platform like a global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
component or an inertial navigation system (INS), the measure
of a physical signature, for example a visual, electromagnetic
or acoustic one. We also consider the possibility to realize the
attack directly on part of the hardware.
We can see from this Table that the majority of papers,
that address drone-involved risks, are in the ground to drone
direction. This is due to the facility to operate with a SDR
embeddable solution in the ground side. Nevertheless, as seen
in Section III, some SDR solutions can be embedded in a
mobile platform, making possible the operation in the drone
to ground direction. Drone to drone operations are however,
so far very rarely investigated.
In the intensity of uses, we can see the high correlation with
the technical aspects of Table II. However, we don’t see any
structured convergence in the time evolution of the intensity in
the different cases, beyond the evolution from a ground side
of operation to a mobile one due to the technical correlation.
This suggests that the domain is not yet really matured, and
that it will probably grow in the future. We discuss this point
in the next section.
V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
Our study shows that some cases are well explored like
”Attacks and Counter-measures” from Ground to Drone. But
they also benefit from the poorness of current drone attacks
that don’t use today SDR capacities as we can see in the
Columns ”Attack from Drone to Ground” in Table I.
The challenge on the UAV side is the use of embedded SDR,
which has already been experimented for specific application
like wildlife tracking [49]. Once this question is solved and
optimized to provide expected performances, it will actually
means that SDR can be used to elaborate more sophisticated
attacks. These attacks can for instance rely on cognitive radio
techniques to develop stealth communications and remain
undetected by conventional base stations. The embedded SDR
can also be used to provide the UAV with efficient counter-
measures against jamming for instance.
These threats will likely appear but on the ground SDR
can also be used to improve counter measures against current
and upcoming attacks by introducing adaptive techniques also
based on cognitive radio concepts. These detection techniques
are known but require today high performance computing [50].
Meanwhile existing solutions are sill improving, for instance
SDR can be used to develop smarter GPS Spoofing that
take into account the UAV position in order to adapt power
[51]. Real-time processing is a challenge on both sides. On
the ground real-time detection is required to detect unknown
waveforms that can be developed with embedded SDR. On the
UAV side, the use of field programmable gate array circuit
(FPGA) can also be required to implement fast bandwidth
scanning with fast Fourier transform (FFT) to quickly switch
to available second user (SU) channels or simply unused
channels. Such embedded processing imposes to avoid high-
latency I/Os and so requires near sensor computing [47].
To conclude SDR is an opportunity for both attacks and
counter-measures, it represents a research domain that must
be explored to anticipate upcoming threats. Interesting topics
such as “how SDR can improve security or insert new vulner-
abilities to UAVs” will be studied in future work.
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